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IN THE SUPREME COU·RT 
of the 
STATIE OF UTAH 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE 
IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE RAY 
DUNHAM, VOLUNTARY 
BANKRUPT, 
Plaint~!! and Appell.ant, 
-vs.-
GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA 
DUNHAM, HIS WIF·E, 
Defendants ~and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9012 
There is very little, if any, dispute in the facts of this 
case. The dispute arises in the interpretation thereof. 
Appellant's statement of facts is substantially correct if 
the argmnentative 1natter is disregarded. However, the 
following brief supplemental statement of facts might be 
helpful. 
George and Leoda Dunham are in their late fifties 
and had worked at various jobs, including the mines and 
the railroad prior to the aquisition of the subject prop-
ertly up along the Upper Provo River in Summit County 
in 1944 (R. 8, 9, 17, 19). 
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The property was purchased from Mrs. Kirkpatrick 
with $1000 down payment, paid out of Leoda Dunham's 
money, with $40.00 a month payable from the income 
from the property (R. 133). None of George's money 
went into the transaction (R. 20, 56, 133). 
Thereafter Leoda Dunham managed the property, 
with the help of George who acted as handy man around 
the tavern. Various lots were sold from the property, 
the deeds for which were prepared for the signature of 
both Leoda and George by officers of the Coalville or 
Kamas State Bank, and the proceeds from which went 
directly to either of the banks to pay an existing mortgage 
on the property (R. 133). 'The banks handled all of the 
details on these transactions, except the original contact 
and showing of the property by either George or Leoda 
(R. 139). 
George ever since his days with the railroad had been 
a heavy drinker spending any money he earned on liquor. 
Leoda therefore managed and ran the property c~nsider­
ing it as her own (R. 133-139). In October 1952, George 
had serious heart attacks sending him to the hospital (R. 
68). Because of this illness and on November 1, 1952, 
Leoda and George went to Lamar Dlmcan attorney to 
have him prepare a deed from George to Leoda and the 
deed was prepared, executed and acknowledged on said 
date in Mr. Duncan's office (R. 68-70). The deed was 
delivered to Leoda ·who placed it in a strong box in her 
home at the subject premises (R.137). 
Thereafter George and Leoda continued to live on 
the premises, Leoda managing and George helping in the 
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same manner up to the present time (R. 133-138). How-
ever, in November 1953 George was involved in an auto-
mobile accident as a result of which the creditors, Size-
more and Garrett and George suffered serious injuries 
(R. 138). Leoda Dunham, because of the extent of the in-
juries, recorded the aforesaid deed, which up to that time 
she had not recorded not believing it necessary (R. 72). 
After the accident, George was left with serious per-
manent disabilities affecting his memory and speech 
(R. 138). Leoda and George from that time on to the 
present have lived on the property, Leoda has managed, 
George has helped, and additional lots have been sold, 
some in the name of both parties and some in the name of 
Leoda alone (R. 137, 138). Leoda· continued, as in the 
past, to negotiate with the bank in the sale of the various 
lots applying the proceeds therefrom, as well as the pro-
ceeds from her business to the satisfaction of the mort-
gage (R. 104) (Ex. 15). Except for the mortgage, George 
had no debts when the executed the deed (R. 136, 137). 
Mr. Tom Lefler at the Kamas State Bank handled 
all of the transactions, and had the mortgages and deed 
signed by both George and Leoda, although he knew of 
the execution of the deed prior to the accident (R. 98-
105). This was to conform the documents with the record 
title according to the bank's attorney's instructions (R. 
105). 
ARGUMENT 
It is apparent that Appellant is contending that the 
trial court has made Findings and Conclusions contrary 
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to the evidence. However, Appellant does not point out 
any specific deficiencies in the evidence, but merely disa-
grees with the inferences and conclusions arrived at by 
the trial court based upon the evidence of the case. From 
the evidence Appellant draws his own inferences, con-
trary to those of the trial court, and seeks to have this 
Court affirm him in his beliefs. The brief is not so much 
one seeking redress of error in law, but one seeking re-
trial of the fact issues. Appellant's theory and argument 
in support thereof herein presented is patently contrary 
to the many rulings of this Court, some of which are 
hereinafter cited. 
The following quotation from Parrish v. Tahtaras, 
7 Utah 2d 87 is representative of the applicable rule of 
law: 
"Since the court made findings and entered 
judgment based thereon, it is our duty to review 
·· the evidence in a light most favorable to the find-
ings. In reciting the facts, therefore, we state 
them as found by the trial court so long as the 
record shows some competent evidence from which 
said findings could derive.'' 
Again, as has been stated in Rummell v. Bailey, 7 
Utah 2d 137: 
"The rule of review of issues of fact is that 
all of the evidence and every inference and intend-
ment fairly arising therefrom should be taken in 
light 1nost favorable to the finding made by the 
trial court. And if when so viewed there is sub-
stantial support in the evidence for the finding 
made, it will not be disturbed." 
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Other cases upholding this same principle are McCollum. 
v. Clothi·er (Utah) 241 Pac. 2d 465; Lawrence v. Bamber-
ger Railroad Company) 3 Utah 2d 247; Fleming v. Flem-
ing-Felt Company) 7 Utah 2d 293; and, Buehner Block 
Company v. GlezosJ 6 Utah 2d 226. 
Appellant raises no questions of law in his brief, but 
rather attempts to construe the facts and the inferences 
arising therefrom according to his own theory of fraud. 
It must be recognized that fron1 any fact situation, there 
might possibly be more than one inference. However, to 
have this Court now set aside the trial court's Findings, 
would be to hold that no reasonable minds would arrive 
at the same conclusions as did the trial court. Such a hold-
ing would appear unlikely under the evidence adduced at 
the trial. 
POINT NO. I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's Point No. I is general in nature and does 
not pin point any particular reversible error committed 
by the trial court, but merely makes an all inclusive 
charge as to the insufficiency of the evidence. However, 
as one reads through the entire brief, it becomes appar-
ent, that appellant's entire appeal is based upon his disa-
greement with the trial court's inferences and conclusions 
derived from the evidence adduced at the trial. It is not 
a question of the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter 
of law. This is graphically demonstrated on pages 14 
through 18, wherein appellant attempts to disprove the 
execution of the deed by parading before this court cer-
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tain "badges of fraud.'' These badges are fraudulent, 
only because appellant makes such .an inference from the 
facts. His own inferences then, are used by appellant to 
disprove uncontradicted evidence of the execution of the 
deed. 
A. THE DEED WAS EXECUTED NOVEMBER 1, 1952. 
Under the Pre-Trial Order and at the trial, the ap-
pellant first had to prove that the deed was not executed 
on November 1, 1952. Appellant's own witness, LaMar 
Duncan, as well as Mrs. Leoda Dunham and Thomas Lef-
ler, all testified unequivocably that the deed was so exe-
cuted, acknowledged and delivered on November 1, 1952. 
The evidence further showed without contradiction that 
the deed was given to Leoda because of George's serious 
heart attacks, and that the description was taken from a 
Tax Notice (R. 30-34, 94, 95, 102-105, 108, 134-137, 139). 
Now, in this appeal, .appellant wants this court to 
overrule the trial court's finding that said deed was so 
executed, by holding that there was no reasonable evi-
dence to support such a finding, and because the infer-
ences appellant draws from the badges of fraud complete-
ly overwhelm said uncontradicted evidence. An examina-
tion hereinafter of the so-called badges of fraud very 
clearly shows the reasonable basis of the trial court's 
:findings. Tllis examination also shows that the only basis 
for appellant's position is his attempt to impute dis-
honesty to attorney LaMar Duncan and to Mrs. Dunham, 
which accusations are as unfounded as are the appellant's 
general claims of "fraudulent intent" found throughout 
the brief. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
1. GEORGE'S ASSERTION OF TITLE. 
Mrs. Dunham negotiated and dealt with the Kamas 
State Bank regarding the varios deeds, releases of mort-
gage, sales and application of the sales proceeds, all in 
connection with the various transactions involving sales 
of portions of the Property (R. 89, 92-102). There is no 
doubt but what George talked with proposed buyers and 
showed them around the property (R. 66). However, con-
trary to appelant's statement and after the deed was re-
corded, George Dunhan1 did sign a deed (Ex. 11) and 
the mortgage (Ex. 11) was prepared by the bank for his 
signature (Ex. 14). One deed was executed by Leoda 
Dunham alone (Ex.10). Mr. Lefler stated that the reason 
for the change in the form of the deed was that the bank's 
attorneys required the documents to be executed in ac-
cordance with the record title, and, of course, the record 
title would only have changed when the deed was re-
corded November 17, 1953 (R. 94-96, 139). 
Other than the difference in the deed forms, pre-
pared by the bank, the evidence shows no great change 
in the conduct of the parties after the deed was recorded 
as compared to prior thereto (R. 78-80). Leoda from 
first to last, paid for the property, managed the property, 
dealt with the bank and generally directed George in 
whatever he did either as handy man or as contacting 
people for the sale of lots. They lived together as hus-
band and wife on the property all of the time. Can it be 
said that these facts show George's claim to ownership 
contrary to the lower Court's findings. I think not. 
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2. RECORDING PLAT. 
Appellant makes a great deal out of the recordation 
of the subdivision plat. Plaintiff's witness, the County 
Recorder, however, testified that the mere fact that the 
stamp on the plat indicated that the document was re-
corded at the request of a person did not by any means 
indicate ownership (R. 130, 131). This is well understood 
by anyone who has recorded any documents in the County 
Recorder's Office. 
3. PREPARATION OF DEED. 
Is it really unusual, as argued by appellant, to have 
Mr. Duncan prepare the deed and to have the bank handle 
all of the other deeds wherein portions of the property 
were sold~ Should not the bank prepare the deeds, handle 
the payments thereon, apply the payments to the bank's 
mortgage and make partial releases, all in connection 
with the bank's interest in the property under its mort-
gage (R. 89, 96, Ex. 15) and under an assignment of the 
lot sale proceeds~ 
4. ~CONTINUED POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. 
Appellant claims that George Dunham retained pos-
session after the execution of the deed. The record is 
clear that George lived at the tavern and worked on the 
property as a handy 1nan fr01n the time Camp l{ilkare 
was purchased up to the present (R ..... ). It would be un-
usual indeed, to require George to move away or to stop 
his work in order to negative fraud. 
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5. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED ILLNESS. 
Was the stroke suffered by George in October, 1952, 
merely a claimed illness, as is argued by appellant (R. 68, 
135) ~ One only has to observe and talk with Mr. Dunhan1 
to understand his physical and mental capabilities, and 
the trial court had this opportunity of observation and 
appraisal. Should the respondents Dunham be expected 
to know the ramifications and legal consequences of joint 
tenancy, as is argued by appellant~ Again, an observa-
tion of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham, their appearance, demean-
or, personality, character and testimony would clearly 
answer this question (R. 68). Notwithstanding the trial 
eourt's appraisal of the parties, appellant now maintains 
that the lower court's opinion as to the parties' testimony 
is clearly erroneous, and, in effect, argues that the trial 
court should not have believed George and Leoda Dunham 
in their respective testimonies, and as a matter of fact, 
should not have believed any of the other witnesses, ex-
cepting as to testimony in favor of appellant. 
6. THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIP-
TION. 
The description on the N overnber 1, 1952 deed was 
given to Mr. Duncan by Mrs. Dunham from a Tax Notice 
(R. 71). Appellant surely realizes that the property 
description on a Tax Notice gives the absolute minimum 
by way of descriptive terms, and admittedly does not in-
clude water rights or other sirnilar types of appurten-
ances. Appellant nevertheless argues that the use of the 
abbreviated description when compared with the original 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
description on the Kirkpatrick deed, which included water 
rights, graphically points up fraud on the part of the 
defendants. 
7. MR. LAYTON'S S'TATEMENT. 
Again the trial court's interpretation of and reliance 
upon the testimony of a witness is challenged by appel-
lant. Admittedly, Mr. Layton was not clear in pin point-
ing the date upon which Mr. Dunham infonned him of 
the deed to Mrs. Dunham. At one point, Mr. Layton in-
dicated his conversation was immediately following his 
acquisition of his first lot at Camp Kilkare, sometime in 
the Fall of 1953 (R. 147, 148). At another time, Mr. Lay-
ton indicated that this conversation was at least a year 
before the accident (R. 150). The latter testimony would 
be consistent with the date of the execution of the deed 
and the former testimony would be inconsistent. The trial 
court chose to disregard the unconsistency in the testi-
mony (R. 155). Again appellant attempts to argue that 
the trial court had no right to either believe or disbelieve 
the testimony or portions of the testimony of the witness. 
8. GEORGE DUNHAM'S UNCERTAINTY. 
Mr. Dunham was himself frank to admit that he could 
not recall the exact circumstances under which the deed 
was executed. Such uncertainty is entirely consistent with 
Mr. Dunharn's generally clouded memory and physical de-
fects arising not only from his stroke but from the serious 
injuries resulting from the accident (R. 19, 28). Again 
the trial court had the opportunity to hear the testimony 
and to evalue the weight and accuracy thereof. Certainly 
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such frankness is not indicative of an intent by Mr. Dun-
ham to falsify the execution date of the deed. It is for 
the trial court to draw the inferences from the testimony 
and it is not for appellant nor for the writer here to at-
tempt to negative the inferences so drawn. 
Is it fair and reasonable to now state that the above 
separately stated matters from 1 to 8, are "badges of 
fraud"~ Is not each circumstance susceptible of a reason-
able inference of rationality, reliability and bona fide-
ness~ Was not the trial court justified in inferring from 
these facts that the deed had been executed on November 
1, 1952~ 
None of the inferences drawn by appellant from the 
foregoing facts even remotely negative the unquestion-
able execution of the deed. 'There is reasonable justifica-
tion for all these matters, completely untainted with 
fraud. 
B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO FRAUD. 
At Page 19 of appellant's brief, appellant assumes as 
a matter of argument that the deed was executed on No-
vember 1, 1952, and then contends that notwithstanding 
said execution, there is actual fraudulent intent which 
brings the conveyance under Section 25-1-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. It is clear that said section requires 
"actual intent . . . to defraud either present or future 
creditors ... " This section prohibits the finding of intent 
based upon a presumption. Appellant, however, although 
he calls this actual intent, is suggesting by innuendo and 
inference a fraudulent scheme on the part of the re-
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spondents. ·Certainly there can be no suggestion from the 
evidence, or any reason for such a suggestion, that fraud 
was intended against any present creditors on November 
1, 1952. There simply were no present creditors at that 
time, other than a few minor current bills owed b}, 
Leoda Dunham (R. 136, 137). The note and mortgage in 
favor of the bank was· admittedly in existence, but ample 
security existed to cover the obligation and such a credi-
tor under the circumstances could hardly be classed as 
a present creditor of George Dunhan1 (R. 141). The 
various conveyances from time to time and the payment 
to the bank of the proceeds therefrom certainly indicate 
nothing by way of insolvency or fraudulent intent against 
present creditors. Mr. Dunham's ill health was and is 
the reason for the execution of the deed November 1, 
1952. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever indi-
cating the possibility or probability of future creditors 
on N ovmnber 1, 1952. The accident very obviously was 
not anticipated. Mrs. Dunham had been operating Camp 
Kilkare for seevral years, had applied the proceeds from 
the business to pay off the mortgage and to pay the 
current expenses. There is absolutely no factual basis for 
argument that there was actual intent to defraud any 
future creditors. It would seems quite elen1entary in 
showing actual intent to defraud that the defrauding 
part~, haYe at least son1e suspicion or anticipation of the 
existence of s01ne future creditors 'vho would be sub-
jected to the fraud; or some schenw to defraud future 
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creditors generally. Such a showing is 1nanifestly lacking 
in this case. 
This general rule is stated in 24 A.m. Jur. 285: 
"Whereas the familiar indicia or badges of 
fraud may in many instances be· relied on by an 
existing creditor .as establishing a case for the 
granting of relief, it is not sufficient for the sub-
sequent creditor to make out a case ·of merely 
constructive fraud, founded on such facts as lack 
of consideration or insolvency on the part of the 
transferer; he must establish fraud in fact or 
actual fraud, and he must assume the burden of 
proof in this respect." 
Appellant further cites as evidence of the actual in-
tent to defraud, the various "badges of fraud" herein-
before discussed and from these facts attempts to infer 
actual intent. This inference the trial court did not find 
and such inferences could not support a finding of actual 
intent, in any event. 
Appellant cites Section 25-1..:4 and charges that a 
conveyance under this section rendering the person in-
solvent is a fraudulent conveyance. There is no evidence 
in this case to indicate the insolvency of Mr. Dunham in 
November of 1952. Mrs. Dunham testified that George 
had no debts. The record does show, however, a mortgage. 
It would be strange indeed were we to say that a mort-
gagor renders himself insolvent when he conveys prope-r-
ty encumbered by a mortgage by reason of fact that the 
mortgage note still remains in his name. Such a con-
ception of the law of insolvency completely ignores the 
purpose of a mortgage and the place that the security 
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takes in the foreclosure of the mortgage indebtedness. 
The property was more than adequate security for the 
mortgage as is evident by comparing the original pur-
chase price with the amounts of the mortgages. There 
is no evidence to indicate a possible deficiency against 
the defendant, George Dunham. As a matter of fact, all 
conveyances of the property in the various parcels re-
sulted in payments on the mortgage and Leoda Dunham 
herself made mortgage payments out of the income from 
the property. Under these facts, wherein lies insolvency~ 
The matter of consideration is raised in appellant't: 
brief in discussing Section 25-1-4. It is clear that the 
down payment was made by Leoda Dunham from her 
own money. It is further clear that the payments on the 
mortgage, the proceeds of which were used to pay the 
Kirkpatrick contract, all came from the income from 
Camp KilKare and from the sales of portions of the land. 
In the case of Schreyer v. Scott, 134 U.S. 955, a case 
on all four's with the present one, the United States 
Supreme Court held that where the original consideration 
is paid by one spouse and the balance of the contract 
payments are from the proceeds realized fron1 the prop-
erty, the full consideration is determined to be that of 
the spouse contributing the down payment and the other 
person has no interest in the property. The court further 
held that under these facts, a conveyance from the hus-
band to the wife of his legal interest, whatever it may 
be, is supported by consideration. See also Harbach r. 
Ifill, 112 U.S. 144; JJicDonald v. Dezcey, 202 U.S. 529; 
Lumpkin v.liicPllee, 286 P.2d 299 (N.l\iex.). 
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There was no evidence in this case indicating that 
these payments were not made as testified to and it is 
difficult to infer from this evidence that there was no 
consideration. The trial court did not make such a finding 
and if this court now so holds, it would be to disregard 
the well accepted principle of law that all inferences 
arising from the evidence must be construed in favor 
of the trial court's Findings of Fact. 
Therefore, under Section 25-1-4, appellant can nei-
ther show insolvency nor inadequate consideration. Even 
if these elements were present, appellant would only have 
shown constructive fraud, rather than actual fraud, and 
under the above authorities, as well as the Utah Statutes 
above cited, constructive fraud is not sufficient to enable 
a subsequent creditor to prevail. 
POINT II 
FINDINGS OF F A.CT NOS. 4, 5 AND 7 ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND 'THE LAW. 
The only new matter raised under Point II involves 
a question of the adequacy of the consideration passing 
from Leoda Dunham to George Dunham in connection 
with the November 1, 1952 deed. Appellant states that 
there is no evidence to support Findings of Fact Nos. 
4, 5 and 7, and that, therefore, there is no pre-existing 
consideration passing from the grantee to the grantor. 
It is readily apparent in the Findings of Fact that 
Paragraph No. 4 relates to the consideration paid by 
Leoda Dunham to Carrie Kirkpatrick, and to the applica-
tion to the purchase price of the proceeds from the lot 
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sales. As has been previously indicated, Leoda Dunham 
was the owner of the property, took care of the property, 
thereafter sold the property, and George Dunham had no 
interest therein, other than a legal interest as shown on 
the record title. The evidence as to the payments by 
Leoda Dunham sufnciently support Finding of Fact No. 
4, independent of the consideration question, and also 
support a finding of consideration, were such a finding 
necessary. See Schreyer vs. Scott, supra. However, con-
sideration is not here necessary to sustain defendants' 
position. The mere fact that the deed is not supported by 
consideration does not make a fraudulent transaction. 
There must be other indications of fraud, including in-
solvency, sufficient to show actual intent to defraud 
future creditors. These matters have been presented 
heretofore in respondent's brief. 
Our court has stated in Smith v. Edu:ards, 81 rtah 
244, that: 
"A conveyance ·without consideration is vol-
untary, but not for that reason alone fraudulent." 
The court indicates there n1ust also be insolvency, the 
burden of proof of which must be borne by the creditor 
seeking to set aside the conveyance. The Court therein 
adopts the definition of insolvency set forth in Title 25-
1-1, Utah ·Code Annotated, to-wit: 
"A person is insolvent when the present fair 
saleable value of his assets is less than the amount 
that will be required to pay his probable liability 
on his existing debts as they bee01ne absolute and 
matured." 
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George Dunham, as found by the trial court, had no 
interest in the property, other than a legal interest, prior 
to the execution of the deed. There is no evidence whatso-
ever from which one could infer that the execution of the 
deed rendered George Dunham insolvent. Any obligation 
he had was secured by the mortgage against the prop-
erty and under the definition above set forth, there would 
be no amotmt required to pay his liability as· the debt 
became absolute and matured. There is no evidence what-
soever to indicate that the property was not completely 
adequate to secure the debt and the burden was on the 
plaintiff to show that to he a fact, if such be the case. 
The facts ·to the contrary show that the mortgage was 
periodically reduced by the payments from the business 
and from the sale of the lots. 
Appellant relies at great length upon the case of 
Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, in support of the propo-
sition that mere oral testimony between relatives will 
not sustain a finding that there was past consideration 
for the execution of this deed. Appellant quotes at Page 
23 from this decision, but very conveniently omits a por-
tion of the quotation indicating that the court had other 
facts before it upon which the decision was based. The 
omitted portion of the quotation is as follows : 
"On the contrary, there are a number of facts 
disclosed by the evidence which tend to show that 
the mortgage was executed for the purpose of pre-
venting the Walkers from collecting the amount 
owing to them by Anthony and Ida Paxton." 
The court, in the Paxton case, was not concerned merely 
with the lack of consideration, but also found other facts, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
indicating the actual fraudulent intent of the grantor 
insofar as existing creditors were affected. Thus the 
Paxton case is clearly distinguishable in many respects. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT RAISES NO NEW MATTER UNDER THIS 
POINT 'THA:T HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY DISCUSSED 
ABOVE. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULNG AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF MR. DUNCAN. 
This Point relates to a portion of the testimony of 
Lamar Duncan a witness of Appellant. During the course 
of Appellant's counsel's examination of Mr. Duncan, 
said counsel undertook a long series of questions, ap-
parently intending to test the memory of Mr. Duncan 
relating to certain stipulations in a prior case, involving 
Respondents. (R 35-38). Objection was made for the rea-
son that said questioning concerned the contents of the 
stipulations, without giving Mr. Duncan the opportunity 
of examining them when said stipulations ·were in Court 
in the possession of Appellant's counsel. Said objection 
w:as sustained and the Court directed counsel for ap-
pellants to continue his exan1ination (R. 38). There wa~ 
no motion to strike any testiinony, but Inerely an ob-
jection as to the type of questions being asked. The stipu-
lations were present and should have been used by 
Appellants counsel, as the best evidence of their content~. 
An examination of the pleadings and of the record 
on the Motion To Strike certain other affidavits filed 
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in the case, (R. 158-175), shows that said affidavits and 
8tipulations in question would have added nothing to the 
case and certainly indicate nothing to show the untruth-
fulness of any testimony of Mr. Duncan relative to the 
issues of the case. 
It is apparent that counsel for Appellant has at 
pages 30-32 of his brief misinterpreted the rulings of the 
trial court in this matter. The trial court did not strike 
the testimony of Mr. Duncan at all, but sustained an ob-
jection because the questioning was improper in asking 
Mr. Duncan to recall from memory the contents of a 
document which Appellant's counsel had in his posses-
siOn. 
There is manifestly no error in this regard, much 
less do we have reversible error committed by the trial 
court. 
SUMMARY 
The execution of the deed from George to Leoda 
Dunham can not be challenged by showing inferences of 
fraudulent intent. The execution of the deed on November 
1, 1952 is an uncontradicted fact and such a fact is not 
buried by an avalanche of innuendoes. The deed was 
executed and delivered and under the pre-trial order the 
Appellant failed to clear the first and most important 
hurdle in his case by showing that said deed was not so 
executed. 
Since the facts show without question the execution 
of the deed, the other matters concerning failure of con-
sideration, insolvency and similar 'badges of fraud' need 
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not be considered. It is clear that for a subsequent credi-
tor to overthrow a prior conveyance upon the grounds of 
fraud, he must pro;ve clearly and convincingly an actual 
fraud on the part of the grantor. Badges of fraud, in-
ferences of fraud or constructive fraud are not enouglJ. 
Our statute and our case law clearly uphold this rule. 
Here, however, there are not even "badges of fraud.'' 
There was consideration, there was no insolvency, and 
the other "badges" such as insufficient descriptions, fail-
ure to record and the like was merely misinterpretations 
of the evidence by appellant. 
The trial court had ample and reasonable evidence 
to support its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
and the Supreme Court should give all reasonable in-
ferences in favor of such findings. 
The trial court should be affinned in its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHA!I 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Counsel for Responde·nt 
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